American Greetings Corp. and the Triple “W”

On December 22nd, 2011 we began purchasing shares of American Greetings Corp. at $12.91 per share for investors. To our surprise we were able to get several more large blocks of the shares in extended hours trade yesterday evening (Jan. 4th, 2012) for the same accounts.

We’re thrilled that as of the writing of this article, the price has actually gone down even further (explained below).

We like to think of the stock as having three possible outcomes for buyers in our time frame:

a) The price goes up and the shareholders Win
(Simple equity appreciation)

b) The price goes down and the shareholders Win
(Increased share repurchases and related improvement in earnings metrics)

c) The price doesn’t move and the shareholders Win
(High dividend and real estate give away)

Because of the great volatility in potential outcomes involved we affectionately refer to it as the “Win-Win-Win” or Triple “W” stock. We think it will have special appeal to those who confuse “Beta” with “risk”.

Our original purchases followed a rather precipitous (25%) decline in the share price from the December 21st closing price and an overall decline of some 50% in the share price since the beginning of 2011.

When the share repurchases over the years are taken into account the price of the issue has effectively declined about 75% since its mid 2007 highs. This share-adjusted decline is rather extraordinary given the fact that the tangible net worth in the company is actually higher now than it was then, but again this figure, much like the adjusted per-share book value is not immediately evident. This is largely because of a large write-down in intangibles taken in 2009. If intangibles were overstated in 2009, they are now understated, a presentation we prefer.

Growth in equity in recent years

Year	Delta	Equity
2007		$1,013,000,000
2008	-7%	$943,000,000
2009	-44%	$529,000,000
2010	23%	$651,000,000
2011	17%	$764,000,000
2012 Q3	0%	$766,977,000
12 mo. forecast		$871,311,316
	.
Avg 2010-2012:		14%
Avg. w/ dividend:		18%
BV per share (1yr.)	$22.07

Growth in “Per Share Book Value” in the same period

Year	Delta	BV per share
2007		$ 17.47
2008	0%	$ 17.46
2009	-36%	$ 11.26
2010	48%	$ 16.69
2011	14%	$ 19.10
2012 through Q3	2%	$ 19.43

BV ps (1 yr.)		$ 23.76

Avg 2010-2012:		21%
Avg. w/ dividend:		26%

The business does not immediately meet the criteria of a traditional “value” investment, at least not from a “Net Working Capital” perspective (their “net working capital” position is negative), but we are excited to own the shares nonetheless because the company does boast very positive stats at the current price and more security in the assets backing the issue than may be immediately obvious to the casual observer.

Positive Metrics:

1. In the twelve months running up to the most recent earnings announcement, the company threw off about 90 mln. In free cash from operations, which represents about 20% of the market cap.

2. Net income available to the common is ~83 mln. in the same time frame, or about 18% of the market cap (representing ~100% return of the buyers investment in about 4 years’ time when taken together with the nearly 5% annual dividend)

3. These figures create a rather low trailing Price to Earnings ratio of only ~6.3 and while we don’t typically ascribe to forward P/E ratios’ we do believe AM will hit their future targets, and so the ~6 figure for future P/E seems acceptable.

4. Finally we are left with an Enterprise Value/EBITDA (ttm) of only 3.22 and a tiny Price/Book (mrq) of just .64 (even less when the present market value of certain assets is considered)

Share Repurchases

As good as the metrics are above, they are actually understated. Items 1 through 3 (the earnings derivatives) are all about to change. Yesterday after close of market the company announced another 75 mln. share repurchase program. The last share repurchase program was announced in 2009 and was also for 75 million, with the last tranche (revealed in the Q3 2012 earnings release) removing another 2 mln. shares from the open market.

At the current price, the new program has the potential to take back an additional 15% of the remaining shares (about 6 mln.) over and above the ~50% already taken off the market over the last seven years. These are large, aggressive and very share holder friendly actions, the impact of which the average investor may not fully appreciate.

The average retail or passive investor may not always asses the dynamics of these finer points (which have nothing to do with the all-important “sales trends” most obsess on). "Value-oriented" fund managers may be more savvy in this respect but are likely to find the company is simply too small to make a meaningful investment in. However, for a third genus of the species; the “enterprising” and independent value oriented investor “there's gold in them thar' mountains”.

Share repurchase math for recent years:

Year	Number of Shares	decrease
2007	58000000
2008	54000000	-6.90%
2009	47000000	-12.96%
2010	39000000	-17.02%
2011	40000000	2.56%
2012 through Q3	39480798	-1.30%

	Avg:	-7.12%

12 month forecast	36668605	-7.12%

On average the company has repurchased just over 7% of their own shares per annum in recent years, a trend which is now assured to continue, and would indicate some ~36.6 mln. shares outstanding in the next 12 months. However it may be fair to forecast an even small number outstanding by this time next year. We reason this, because the company was willing to pay an average price of $17.25 per share (34.5 mln.) to accumulate the 2 mln. shares they took back in Q3 2012 alone, so we think it is likely they would be out buying aggressively when the stock is presently below $13. All that the enterprising investor needs to do then, particularly if the earnings coefficients are more important than the statement of assets, is recalculate points 1 -3 above with the new divisor (call it 35 mln. shares).

This taken with the unusually high dividend is something like getting a free derivative hedge for recent buyers. Here are two scenarios:

The "hoped for" scenario of the average short-term investor - the price goes up

Owners of the company’s common shares (unlike senior secured debt holders) have an increase in the value of their holdings, which as marketable securities can be realized at any time. In the meantime, a 5% dividend should assuage the seemingly “long-sufferings” of the impatient.

The less obvious "enterprising" scenario - the price goes down

The company will be out buying shares at a lower price (thus stretching the dollars so to speak), and increasing not only per share future earnings for existing owners, but also increasing (without any further capital outlay), their pro-rata share of the company. If you’re an owner and don’t mind being a little patient, then nothing can be better than a decline in the price of the shares because, much like a derivative hedge (and a free one), owners are actually getting paid for a decline in the share price, but unlike an owner of derivatives, can focus on the full benefits of real and direct ownership in a long standing profitable company.

Good news for Hard Core balance sheet investors

Anyone who reads the Amvona blog knows that we are not big fans of real estate – we just think an investor shouldn’t pay for something that they will never really own.

However, considering ourselves to be reasonable, we are willing to make exceptions, particularly in the case where the real estate was acquired prior to the 2002-2007 era (or 'the good old days' when Ponzi schemes using real estate was all the rage), and when the price is, well, free as is the case in AM.

American Greetings, in their own GAAP’ish way books their assets at Cost, including their real estate. This becomes especially noteworthy when talking about a 105 year old company.

The undervaluation of the real estate on the balance sheet provides greater security than the casual observer may at first realize. ~9.1 mln. sq. feet of commercial space booked at 188 mln. as of FYE 2011 comes to about $20 per square foot. We are not sure on what planet open warehouse space (let alone office) could be built for less than $50 (land costs aside). If this conclusion is accurate than $188 mln. represents less than 40% of the potential value (and in all likelihood much less). So there may be more than $200 mln. in additional tangible value not represented on the balance sheet.

In rough figures $200 mln. in real estate (conservative), divided by 35 mln. shares (also conservative), is an additional ~$5.70 per share in missing tangible book value. If that was added to the current book value of $19.43 (which is also almost all tangible thanks to the 2009 write-down), than the real book value may be north of $25 making the actual P/B ratio much closer to .50 than the stated .65 – that is to say more than an adequate margin of safety or the proverbial “dollar for .50 cents”.

Chief Executive Officer Zev Weiss said in his recent announcement: "We remain committed to our product leadership strategy and recognize that, at times, it may temporarily create volatility in our financial performance. As demonstrated by today's announcement of a new share repurchase authorization, we believe that our current stock price is undervalued."

We couldn’t agree more Zev.